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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44547
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) NEZ PERCE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-8103
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Jack J. Cooney, Jr., guilty of felony operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating
substance.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years
fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Cooney asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to place him on probation.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Lewiston Police Department Officer Zach Ward received notice of an erratic
driver; the reporting party had stated she was following a yellow Saturn that was all over
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the road.  (Presentence Update Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.)1  After being told the
vehicle had turned east, Officer Ward found the vehicle.  (PSI, p.3.)  The vehicle
traveled north while Officer Ward traveled south.  (PSI, p.3.)  The vehicle was partially in
Officer Ward’s lane, and the officer pulled over to avoid a collision.  (PSI, p.3.)  The
vehicle then continued northbound in the opposite lane of travel.  (PSI, p.3.)
Officer Ward decided to stop the vehicle and contacted the driver, Mr. Cooney.
(PSI, p.3.)  Officer Ward noted Mr. Cooney had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred
speech.  (PSI, p.3.)  The officer also smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from Mr. Cooney’s person.  (PSI, p.3.)  When Officer Ward requested Mr. Cooney
performed the standardized field sobriety tests, Mr. Cooney refused.  (PSI, p.3.)
Officer Ward then placed Mr. Cooney under arrest.  (PSI, p.3.)  The officer searched
Mr. Cooney and found on his person a bag containing a green leafy substance,
identified as marijuana.  (PSI, p.3.)  After being taken to jail, Mr. Cooney refused to
provide a breath sample.  (PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Cooney by Information with one count of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, felony, I.C. §§ 18-
8004(1)(a) and 18-8005(9).  (R., pp.66-67.)  The Information further alleged Mr. Cooney
had, within the last fifteen years, pleaded guilty or been convicted a felony violation of
I.C. § 18-8004, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  (See
R., p.67.)  Mr. Cooney entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.68.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial.  (R., pp.105-11.)  The jury found Mr. Cooney
1 All citations to the PSI refer to the 125-page PDF version of the Confidential Exhibits
to Clerk’s Record, which includes the Presentence Update Report and attachments.
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guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.  (R., p.114.)  The jury also
found that Mr. Cooney had within the past fifteen years pleaded guilty to and/or was
found guilty of felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.  (R., p.115.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted the Updated Presentence
Report recommended “a lengthy period of local incarceration along with probation term
for Mr. Cooney.”  (Tr., p.257, Ls.9-15; see PSI, p.10.)  Mr. Cooney requested the district
court follow the recommendation of the presentence investigator by giving him a lengthy
period of local jail time and then placing him back on probation.  (Tr., p.257, Ls.18-22.)
The State asked the district court to instead impose a unified sentence of ten years, with
five years fixed.  (See Tr., p.261, Ls.16-20.)  The district court imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.164-66.)  The sentence was to run
concurrently with the sentence executed in Mr. Cooney’s prior case, Nez Perce County
No. CR 2011-6409 (hereinafter, the prior case).2  (See R., p.165.)
Mr. Cooney filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a reduction
of sentence.  (R., pp.167-68.)  Without conducting a hearing, the district court denied
the Rule 35 motion.  (See R., pp.176-77.)  On appeal, Mr. Cooney does not challenge
the district court’s denial of the Rule 35 motion.3
2 In the prior case, Mr. Cooney had been on probation for felony driving under the
influence, with an underlying suspended sentence of five years, with two years fixed.
(See PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Cooney had also participated in a Therapeutic Community “rider” in
the prior case.  (PSI, p.4.)  During the sentencing hearing here, which also functioned
as the prior case’s probation violation disposition hearing, the district court revoked
Mr. Cooney’s probation and executed the sentence in the prior case.  (See Tr., p.265,
L.20 – p.266, L.1.)  The prior case is the subject of Mr. Cooney’s appeal in No. 44569.
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
4
Mr. Cooney also filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment
of Conviction.  (R., pp.169-72.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to place Mr. Cooney
on probation?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Place Mr. Cooney
On Probation
Mr. Cooney asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to place
him on probation.  The district court should have followed the recommendations of
Mr. Cooney and the presentence investigator by giving Mr. Cooney a lengthy period of
local jail time and then placing him back on probation.
“A trial court’s decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is
appropriate is within its discretion.” State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278 (2002).  Before
imposing a sentence, a district court must consider the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521
regarding whether a defendant should be placed on probation. Id.  “A decision to deny
probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is consistent with the criteria
articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
Section 19-2521 provides that a sentencing court
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of
the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for
protection of the public because:
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Id.
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(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in
the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1) (emphasis added).  Additionally, while not controlling the discretion of
the court, the following grounds
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the
defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of the crime;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided,
however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of
imprisonment and restitution in combination;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or
has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the
commission of the present crime;
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(h) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances
unlikely to recur; [and]
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the
commission of another crime is unlikely.
I.C. § 19-2521(2) (emphasis added).  However, a district court need not “recite the
statutory criteria of I.C. § 19-2521, or its application of the facts to those criteria in
rendering its decision on probation.” Reber, 138 Idaho at 278.
Mr. Cooney asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards when it failed to place him on probation, because it did not
adequately consider factors falling within the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521.  For example, the
presentence investigator recommended placing Mr. Cooney on probation.  As the
Presentence Update Report stated, “Mr. Cooney appears to have done well overall
during this most recent period of supervision and was even transferred to unsupervised
probation.”  (Updated PSI, p.9.)  According to the presentence investigator, Mr. Cooney
“stated he loved [the Therapeutic Community] program and feels it was the best thing
that has ever happened to him.  He said he was able to maintain his sobriety for over
two years after completing this program.”  (Updated PSI, p.9.)
While the presentence investigator stated “incarceration would appear the most
appropriate sentence,” in light of Mr. Cooney’s prior record and continued drinking and
driving, the investigator further noted, “based on his most recent performance on
probation and the fact that he did so well and was even transferred to unsupervised
early; it is difficult to recommend prison.”  (Updated PSI, p.10.)  The Presentence
Update Report concluded: “Mr. Cooney has proven he can do well on probation, but
7
there should be consequences for his actions; therefore a lengthy period of local
incarceration is recommended.”  (Updated PSI, p.10.)
Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cooney’s counsel expressed the
belief that Mr. Cooney “will do well while he’s supervised,” if he were placed on
probation.  (Tr., p.258, Ls.5-6.)  Counsel added, “[t]he hope is that while he’s getting
that supervision, he then gets everything in order so that knowing he’s eventually not
going to be on probation, and he’s not going to have [a] watchful eye on him, that he will
be able to live a clear and sober lifestyle after that.”  (Tr., p.258, Ls.6-11.)
Mr. Cooney’s counsel also mentioned that “Mr. Cooney does have a lot of
support from members of the community that are in the clean and sober community.
Several of them are in court at every one of his appearances, they counsel him.”
(Tr., p.258, Ls.22-25.)  The district court noted one of Mr. Cooney’s supporters was
sitting in the courtroom during the hearing and stated, “I know how he regards you and
he values you for the services you have provided to his business.”  (Tr., p.263, Ls.12-
16.)
As for Mr. Cooney’s work history, according to the Presentence Update Report,
“Mr. Cooney reported he owns his own painting company, Jesus & Jack Painting.  He
said he does all of the painting for Ray J. White and has approximately 15-20 other
contracts.  He stated he had two employees working for him at the time of his arrest.”
(PSI, p.5.)  At the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized Mr. Cooney had “a
well regarded business.  I think people really value your painting services.”  (Tr., p.265,
Ls.10-12.)
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Mr. Cooney submits that, in light of the above mitigating factors falling within the
criteria of I.C. § 19-2521, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards when it failed to place him on probation.  Thus, the district court abused
its discretion.  The district court should have followed the recommendations of
Mr. Cooney and the presentence investigator by giving Mr. Cooney a lengthy period of
local jail time and then placing him back on probation.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Cooney respectfully requests that this Court reduce
his sentence as it deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be
remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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